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 Abstract: The last decades have witnessed a breaking down of the hitherto quasi-
monopoly in industrial and technological development by highly industrialized countries. 
Man-made changes in comparative advantage due to rapid accumulation of human capital, 
development of technical institutions, and public policies in support of enterprise 
development and innovation, have led to the emergence of advanced technical capabilities in 
a number of semi-industrialized countries. Study of selected instances of their technological 
achievement show that they cannot be adequately interpreted as necessarily requiring the 
working of a well integrated national innovation system. They seem to be instead, path, or 
process, dependent, and determined by the circumstantial convergence of requisite skills, 
appropriate institutions and supportive public policies.    
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"ON SEMI-INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AND THE ACQUISITION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES" 
 
by Simón Teitel 
 
  Highly industrialized countries in North America, Europe, and Asia have the potential 
to succeed in undertaking practically any kind of technological development and eventually 
bringing to market the results of their R&D
1. At the other end of the development spectrum is 
the vast majority of developing countries that are generally incapable of comparable 
innovation feats. But sufficient evidence is also available about specific instances of 
successful technological development in selected Asian and Latin-American countries that are 
somewhere in between, and that we call "semi-industrialized". 
 
 
  I. Is There Sharing of Room at the Top? 
 
  Our first step will be to identify a group of semi-industrialized countries that exhibit 
certain economic, industrial, and technological performance features similar to those observed 
in highly industrialized countries. For this purpose, we initially pre-selected the top countries 
in terms of the dollar value of their manufacturing value added. Of course, any such ranking 
implies the need for an arbitrary cut-off point, and we chose to restrict the sample to the top 
25 countries, which, de facto, also implied a value of manufacturing value added of around 30 
billion dollars. 
 
                                                 
    
1 Yet a caveat is in order since, for example, as highly developed a country as Japan failed in its attempts to 
set up an internationally efficient aircraft industry.   
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Table 1. Ranking by Manufacturing Value Added and Other Industrialization and 
Economic Indicators 
 Rank   Country   Mf.VA $   Mf.VA/cap$    GDP $  GDP/cap $ 
 1   USA  1,432,800    5,301   10,065   35,227 
 2   Japan    895,425    7,083    4,141   32,601 
 3   Germany    481,315    5,866    1,846   22,422  
 4   China    355,540      287    1,159      911 
 5   France    280,223    4,762    1,310   22,129  
 6   U.K.    246,789    4,179    1,424   24,219 
 7   Italy    235,087    4,082    1,089   18,788 
 8   Brazil    151,274      912      502    2,915 
 9   Canada    105,725    3,489      694   22,343  
 10   Spain    103,186    2,621      582   14,150 
 11   S. Korea     97,866    2,108      422    8,917 
 12   Russia     97,357      663      310    2,141 
 13   Mexico     81,912      855      618    6,214 
 14   Taiwan     73,183    3,351      281   12,621 
 15   India     63,860       65      417      462 
 16   Nether.     62,061    3,953      380   23,701 
 17   Switzer.     59,084    8,315      247   34,171 
 18   Argentina     53,293    1,475      269    7,166 
 19   Sweden     46,874    5,295      210   23,591 
 20   Australia     46,658    2,488      369   19,019 
 21     Belgium     45,366    4,446      230   22,323 
 22   Turkey     44,106      695      148    2,230 
 23   Austria     41,935    5,191      188   23,186 
 24   Thailand     35,771      584      115    1,874 
 25   Poland     30,129      779      176    4,561 
 
 Notes:  Manufacturing value added (Mf.VA) in millions of US dollars for 1998. 
    Manufacturing value added per capita, (Mf. VA/cap) in US dollars, for 1998. 
     Gross domestic product (GDP) in US dollars for 2001. 
    Gross domestic product per capita (GDP/cap) for 2001. 
 
 Sources: Manufacturing value added and manufacturing value added per capita from UNIDO,  
    Industrial Development Report, 2002/2003, Table A2.14.  
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GDP and GDP per capita from UNDP, Human Development Report, 2003, Table 12, except 
for Taiwan, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 2002, Table 93.  
 
  This choice restricts the group to the most highly industrialized countries in Europe, 
North America, and Oceania, plus Japan, some European countries in transition, as well as a 




      Examination of Table 1 shows that when countries are ranked by the value of their 
manufacturing value added, two developing countries are among the top ten: China, in 4th 
place, and Brazil in 8th place. With Russia included among the industrialized countries, the 
top 25 countries by dollar value of their manufacturing value added comprise 15 
industrialized countries, and 10 developing countries, that we shall call semi-industrialized. 
 
  The 15 industrialized countries are responsible for 81% of the total  dollar value of 
manufacturing value added by all these countries, and the developing, or semi-industrialized, 
ten countries, for the remaining 19%. With respect to geographical, or regional, distribution, 
there are five Asian countries, (China, India, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand), three, Latin 
American countries, (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico), one Middle Eastern-European country 
(Turkey), and one Eastern European economy in transition (Poland)
3.       
 
                                                 
    
2 If a lower cut-off point, say of 20-25 billion dollars in manufacturing value added, were adopted, South 
Africa would be the only Sub-Saharan Africa country making the cut.  
    
3 Poland has been recently accepted in the European Union.  
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  Table 2. Ranking by Manufacturing Value Added Per Capita, 1998, 
  and Population Data for Same Year. 
      Ranking       Country  Mf. Value Added per Cap.      Population 
      1   Switzerland      8,315         7.1 
      2   Japan       7,083       126.4 
      3   Ireland      7,043         3.7 
      4   Singapore      6,178         3.2 
      5   Germany      5,866        82.0 
      6   Finland      5,557         5.1 
      7   USA      5,301       270.3 
      8   Sweden      5,295         8.8 
      9   Austria      5,191          8.1 
     10   Denmark      4,776         5.3 
     11   France      4,762        58.8  
     12   Belgium      4,446        10.2 
     13   United Kingdom      4,179        59.0 
     14   Italy      4,082        57.6 
     15   Netherlands      3,953        15.7 
     16   Norway      3,803         4.4 
     17   Canada      3,489        30.3 
     18   Taiwan      3,351        21.8 
     19   Portugal      2,631        10.0 
     20   Spain      2,621        39.4 
     21   New Zealand      2,611         3.8 
     22   Israel      2,599         6.0 
     23   Australia      2,488        18.7 
     24   Slovenia      2,365         2.0 
     25   Korea, Republic of      2,108        46.4  
     26   Czech Republic      1,612        10.3 
     27   Bahrain      1,577         0.6 
     28   Argentina      1,475        36.1 
     29   Hong Kong      1,411         6.7 
     30   Uruguay      1,125         3.3 
     31   Hungary        947        10.1  
     32   Malaysia        937        22.2  
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     33   Greece        927        10.5 
     34   Brazil        912       165.9 
     35   Mexico        855        95.8 
     36   Poland        779        38.7 
     37   Chile        749        14.8 
     38   Mauritius        739         1.1   
     39   Turkey        695        63.4 
     40   Russian Federation        663       146.9 
 
  Notes:  Manufacturing value added per capita in US dollars. Population in millions. 




  The rankings by manufacturing value added per capita show some semi-industrialized 
countries mingling with the highly industrialized countries in the top positions; to wit: 
Singapore, in fourth place, Taiwan in 18th place, Korea in 25th place, Argentina in 28th 
place, Hong-Kong in 29th, and Uruguay in 30th.  
 
  Due to indivisibilities, critical mass requirements, and economies of scale, prevalent in 
many industrial and technological activities, a number of countries tilt towards exports to 
compensate for small size domestic markets, and, consequently, values of manufacturing 
value added per capita are likely to be higher in countries with small population but 
significant industrial development. Thus it is not surprising that both industrialized and 
developing countries include a number of small population countries which are among the top 
ranked in terms of manufacturing value added per capita. Among highly industrialized 
countries this is true for number 1, Switzerland, (7.1 million population), number 3, Ireland, 
(3.7 millions), number 6, Finland, ( 5.1 millions), number 8, Sweden, (8.8 millions), number 
9, Austria, (8.1 millions), number 10, Denmark (5.3 million), and number 16, Norway, (4.4 
million). Among semi-industrialized countries we similarly have, number 4, Singapore, (3.2 







  II. Developing Countries Ranking at the Top in Selected Industrial, Trade and 
Technology Indicators. 
 
  After a number of preliminary inquiries (See, UNIDO 2002/2003, Statistical Annex), a 
set of indicators was selected to search for the presence of developing countries among top 
ranking industrialized countries. Those indicators cover manufacturing production, trade in 
manufactures, as well as technology acquisition and related human capital formation. They 
are listed and briefly described below. 
 
  Table 3. Selected Indicators to Identify Semi-Industrialized Countries 
   Manufacturing Production       International Trade     Technology Acquisition 
-Manufacturing Value Added (MVA)  - Manufactured Exports (MFXs)  -Tertiary Technical Enrolment (TEnr) 
-Manufacturing Value Added per capita 
(MVAcap) 
- Manufactured Exports per capita 
(MFXscap) 
-Licensing payments per capita (TLic) 
-Technological composition of 
manufacturing value added (TMVA) 
-Technological composition of 
manufactured exports (TMFXs) 
-Enterprise R&D per capita (R&Dcap) 
 
 
  The first two MVA indicators take into account the manufacturing production 
performance of both, large and small countries, while the third one assesses the "quality" or 
composition of the MVA. Similar considerations hold for having two quantity, or value, of 
exports of manufactures indicators, plus one indicator to account for quality, i.e. technological 
complexity, or difficulty, within a certain volume, or value, of manufactured exports. 
Technical tertiary enrolment, as a share of total population, attempts to quantify the 
educational, or human capital formation, effort made by countries to acquire the scientific and 
technical knowledge required by the new technologies used in production. Licensing 
payments per capita, tries to measure the financial effort made to pay for new technical 
knowledge, and enterprise R&D per capita, is supposed to measure the internal effort made to 






  Table 4. Developing Countries Rankings in Selected Industrial and Technology 
Indicators 
 #  Count   MVA  MVAcp   MfXs  MFXcp  TMVA  TMfX  TEnr  TLic  R&Dcp  #Ind  Avrk 
 1  Argen    18    28    --    --    --    --   34   29   31    5  28 
 2  Bahra    --    --    --    --    --    --   27   --   --    1  27 
 3  Brazi     8    34    23    --    13    31   --   33   27    7  24.1 
 4  Chile    --    --    --    --    --    --   13   --   --    1  13 
 5  China     4    --     7    --    24    29   --   --   --    4  15.5 
 6  Colom    --    --    --    --    --     --   28   --   --    1  28 
 7  CRica    --    --    --    32    --    32   --   --   35    3  33 
 8  Egypt    32    --    --    --    --    --   --    34   --    2    33 
 9  HKong    --    29    32    18    19    28   31    4   --     7  23 
 10  India    15    --    29    --    12    --   --   --    --    3   18.7 
 11  Indon    29    --    27    --    --    --   --   --   --    2  28 
 12  Jamai    --    --    --    --    --    --   --   30   --    1  30 
 13  Korea    11    25    11    22     9    10    1    19   13    9  13.4 
 14  Malay    31    32    18    20    11     6   --    6   34    8  19.7 
 15  Mauri    --    --    --    29    --    --   --   --    --    1  29 
 16  Mexic    13    35    13    31    --     4   --   --   --    5  19.2 
 17  Panam    --    --    --    --    --    --   24   35    --    2  29.5 
 18  Phili    --    --    26    --    --     2   26   --   --    3  18 
 19  SArab    --    --    --    35    15    --   --   --    --    2  25 
 20  SAfri    30    --    --    --    33    34   29   --   --    4  31.5 
 21  Singa    33     4    14     1     1     3   33   14    2    9  11.7 
 22  Taiwa    14     18    12    12    14    11    5   16   20    9  13.5 
 23  Thail    24    --    21    34    --    25   --    28   --    5  26.4 




  As shown in Table 4 above, a total of 24 countries made the cut-off rank of 35 in one 
or more of the above indicators
4. Perusal of the table and the number of indicators in which 
each country qualifies, as well as of the last column, with the average rank for each country, 
                                                 
    
4  Thirty five represents a varying proportion of the total number of countries reporting data for each indicator. 
These numbers vary between 87 for the first seven indicators, to 65, and 60, respectively, for the last two.   
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indicates that performance according to the selected criteria is quite lopsided. The countries 
included can be broken down in four geographical groupings: East Asia, with ten  countries, 
Latin America and the Caribbean with nine countries, Africa, with three countries, and the 
Middle East, or Arabic Peninsula, with two countries.  
 
  A number of countries just meet the cut-off requirement only for one indicator. In 
Latin America there are four such cases: Chile and Colombia, in Technical Enrolment where 
they occupy ranks 13 and 28 respectively; Jamaica in Licensing Payments, in rank 30; and 
Uruguay, in Manufacturing Value Added per capita, also in rank 30. In Africa, Mauritius 
qualifies in Manufacturing Exports per capita, in rank 29, and, in other areas, Bahrain in 
Technical Enrolment, in rank 27.  
 
  It is easy to dismiss the above group of six countries as not being really representative 
of strength in the three areas covered by the rankings, i.e. Manufacturing Value Added, Trade 
in Manufactures, and Technology Acquisition. We shall similarly argue to justify the 
exclusion of all other countries that qualified in less than five indicators (i.e. in less than one 
half, or more, of the total number of nine indicators). Thus for example, in East Asia, China 
qualifies in MVA and MfXs, as well as in the Technological Composition of both MVA and 
MFXs, but not in the per capita MVA and MFXs, neither in any of the Technology 
Acquisition indicators. India also qualifies in the MVA and MFXs indicators as well as in the 
Technological Composition of MVA, but not in any of the other indicators, including those 
representing Technology Acquisition effort. Indonesia's performance is similar to India's, but 
it does not qualify in the Technological Composition of MVA. Finally, the Philippines, 
qualifies in MFXs, and their Technological Composition, plus in Technical Enrolment, but it 
misses all representation with respect to MVA (its value, its value per capita, and its 
Technological Composition).  
 
 
  In conclusion, in East Asia we have three country candidates that qualify in all nine 
indicators: Korea, Singapore and Taiwan; additionally, Malaysia that does so in eight, Hong 





In Latin America, besides all the countries qualifying in only one indicator already 
eliminated, we have Costa Rica, that qualifies in three, MFXs per capita, Technological 
Composition of MFXs, and R&D per capita, and Panama, only in two: Technical Enrolment 
and Licensing Payments, i.e. it fails to qualify in all MVA and MFXs indicators. Thus the 
Latin American group of pre-candidates includes: Brazil with seven, and Argentina and 
Mexico with five indicators each.  
 
  In Africa, Egypt only qualifies in MVA and Licensing Payments, while South Africa 
does so in MVA and its Technological Composition, the Technological Composition of 
MFXs, and in Technical Enrolment. In other areas, Saudi Arabia only qualifies in MFXs per 
capita, and in the Technological Composition of MVA. Thus no pre-candidates can be 
selected from these two groups of countries. 
 
  We may now ask: is the performance of pre-selected developing countries in these 
indicators competitive with that of industrialized countries? What are their best results, or, 
better yet, which ones look like areas of potential comparative advantage? 
 
  In the search for extraordinary achievement among developing countries, we below 
we go over each of the indicators and look for countries placing among the top ten in the 
world. 
 
 MVA: Thirteen countries qualified, with an average rank of 20.15. China, in fourth 
place, and Brazil in eight, took top places.  
    
 MVAcap: Nine countries qualified with an average rank score of 26.11. Singapore 
took fourth place world-wide. 
 
 MFXs: Twelve countries qualified with an average rank of 19.42. China occupies the 
seventh place in the world. 
 
 MFXscap: Ten countries qualified with an average rank score of 23.4. Singapore took  
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first place in the world. 
 
 TMVA: Ten countries qualified with an average rank of 15.1. Singapore took first 
place in the world, and Korea the ninth. 
 
 TMFXs: Twelve countries qualified, and their average rank score is 17.92. 
Philippines is in 2nd place, Singapore in third, Mexico in fourth, and Malaysia in sixth. 
 
 TEnr: Eleven countries qualified and their average rank score is 22.82. Korea is in 
first place and Taiwan in fifth, globally. 
 
 TLic: Eleven countries qualified with an average rank score of 22.54. Hong Kong is 
in fourth place and Malaysia in sixth, world-wide. 
 
 R&Dcap: Only seven countries qualified with an average rank score of 23.14. 
Singapore took second place in the world. 
 
  Table 5 summarizes the above information. Indicators in which semi-industrialized 
countries show apparent comparative advantage are: TMVA with a 15.1 average rank, and 
two countries among the top 10; TMFXs with an average score of 17.92 and four countries 
among the top 10 in the world; and MFXs, with an average rank of 19.42, and only one 
country among the top 10. 
 
  Clearly, developing countries seem to be at a greater relative disadvantage in 
technology acquisition than in manufacturing production or trade in manufactures. 
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Table 5. Top Qualifying Developing Countries According to Nine Indicators 
      Indicator 
 
# of Qualifying Countries   Countries  in  Top  10 
Places  
    Average Rank 
 MVA          13  2: China, 4th, Brazil, 8th           20.15 
 MVA cap           9  1: Singapore, 4th           26.11 
 TMVA           10  2: Singapore, 1st, Korea, 9th           15.1 
 MFXs           12  1: China, 7th           19.42 
 MFXs cap          10  1: Singapore, 1st           23.4 
 TMFXs          12  4:  Philippines,  2nd, 
Singapore, 3rd, Mexico, 4th, 
Malaysia, 6th 
 
         17.92 
 TEnr          11  2: Korea, 1st, Taiwan, 5th           22.82 
 TLic          11   2:  Hong-Kong,  4th, 
Malaysia, 6th 
         22.54 




  Singapore is the undisputed star, qualifying among the top ten countries in the world 
in five indicators, with two first places, and one each, second, third and fourth places in the 
others. China is among the top ten countries in two indicators, Korea and Malaysia also in 
two, and Brazil, Hong-Kong, Mexico, Philippines and Taiwan in one each.        
 
  The pre-selection is thus restricted to East Asian and Latin-American countries. 
Among the Asian countries, although Singapore seems to be superior in terms of average 
rank: 11.7, and number of placings among the top ten countries in the world, it must be 
excluded because of its small population (4.1 millions) which induces its strong export 
orientation and justifies its low performance in the MVA indicator. Thus Korea and Taiwan, 
that also qualified in all nine indicators, and have quite low average ranks
5, seem to be the 
best candidates to represent East Asia. 
 
  
                                                 
    
5 Meaning of course that they are close to the top performers.  
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In Latin America, Brazil is the undisputed leader in terms of number of indicators for 
which it qualified, while Argentina and Mexico share second place with five indicators each. 
Argentina missed all trade (exports of manufactures) indicators, while Mexico, missed all 
those pertaining to technology acquisition. Given the purpose of our work, Mexico does not 
seem to be a good candidate. Argentina and Brazil then remain as candidates for Latin 
America to join Korea and Taiwan for the case studies part. Table 6 summarizes pertinent 
information on the four pre-selected countries. 
 
  Given the apparent lack of similarity between the two groups of countries and their 
regions, in terms of both factor endowments and economic policies, it might be hard to 
accept, prima facie, that we are in the presence of comparable  
levels of achievement. We seem to be suggesting that significantly different economic 
development paradigms can lead to similar results.  
 
  Thus the countries in East Asia belong to a group of economies, sometimes called the 
"Asian Tigers", that following the Japanese example adopted an industrial export-led growth 
strategy well-suited to their limited domestic markets and sparse natural resource 




  Table 6. Preselected Semi-Industrialized Countries 
    Country  Population (millions)    GDP per cap. US$   Average Rank 
Argentina         37.5        8,174       28/5   
Brazil        174.0        4,626       24.1/7 
Korea         47.1       13,199        13.4/9 
Taiwan         22.3       12,621       13.5/9 
 
Sources and Notes: Population data, UNDP, 2003, for Argentina, Brazil and Korea. Statistical Yearbook of the 
Republic of China, 2002, for Taiwan. GDP per capita is from World Bank, World Development Indicators. It is 
in constant 1995 US dollars and for the year 2000. The data for Taiwan is  from the same source as population 
and is in current US dollars for the year 2001.  
                                                 
    
6  See, Wade, 1990, and World Bank, 1993.  
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On the other hand, countries in Latin America have been chastised for their inward-
orientation behind protective walls that often led to inefficiency and only sporadic growth 
spurts. 
 
  Although the above broad-brush characterization contains some truth, the record of 
the period 1950-1980 shows about equal average yearly rates of economic growth for both 
regions of around 5.5% per year. (Teitel, 1992, ch. 12). Moreover, while an implicit 
dichotomy between supporting import substituting industries and an export oriented strategy 
is generally assumed, the East Asian countries also went through an import substitution phase, 
and, in Latin America, many of Argentina's and Brazil's successful export industries were part 
of a prior import substitution growth push (Teitel and Thoumi, 1984)
7.     
                                                 
     
7 It is also worth noting that entering the new millennium, the most outstanding economic performances 
belong to two large, subcontinental, giants, China and India, with huge populations and large domestic markets, 
that have recently adopted economic liberalization policies. China's growth strategy is nevertheless strongly 
dependent on reaching world export markets.    
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  III. Case Studies 
 
    Case studies will be drawn from semi-industrialized countries in Asia and Latin 
America. As mentioned above, those selected are: in Asia: Korea and Taiwan, and in Latin 
America: Argentina and Brazil. 
 
    While examination of specific cases in a few countries hardly qualifies as a 
representative sample, we are restricting ourselves to countries with a relatively high 
proportion of value added in manufacturing, substantial diversification in industrial output 
and exports, plus some significant technological assets and achievements. 
 
   A. Argentina. Nuclear Engineering 
  Argentina's traditional accumulation of human capital and institutional strength in 
agronomic sciences, best exemplified by the work carried out at the National Institute of 
Agricultural Technology (INTA), as well as in medicine and the natural sciences, where the 
country earned three Nobel prizes
8, has more recently been extended to engineering and 
technology fields, such as nuclear energy and nuclear engineering. In this case, we can 
observe the confluence of capable and highly trained human resources, the "esprit-de-corps" 
and leadership of the institutions involved (essentially CNEA), as well as the impact of 
appropriate support policies influencing results via the allocation of funds to carry out 
projects with significant risk, but also potential for substantial  technological learning.  
 
  Argentina's record in the nuclear power field is not an unblemished one. After World 
War II, a scientific impostor refugee, Dr. Richter, convinced President Juan D. Peron that he 
had developed a process enabling nuclear energy to be bottled in regular glass bottles for 
distribution and consumption (sic). The direction of the Comision Nacional de Energia 
Atomica (CNEA) was subsequently entrusted to the Navy and it also benefited from the 
services of some very talented and hard-working civilian managers. 
 
                                                 
    
8 Unique among developing countries, Argentine scientists have earned three Nobel prizes: in medicine and 
physiology by Houssay in 1925, in chemistry in 1970, by Leloir, and again in medicine and physiology in 1984, 
by Milstein.  
 
  15
  Case Study: INVAP
9 
 
  The sale in June of 2000 of a nuclear reactor worth 180 million dollars to the 
Australian government, signaled the peak in a series of similar, though smaller, achievements 
of Argentina's nuclear engineering industry. The projected reactor will be destined to research 
and the production of radioactive isotopes for medical and industrial applications. INVAP, a 
public enterprise established in 1976, in Bariloche, by the National Atomic Energy 
Commission (CNEA) of Argentina and the government of the Province of Rio Negro (where 
its laboratories and industrial plants are located), won the contract in competition with firms 
based in Canada, France, Germany and the United States. The project will demand more than 
a million man/hours spread over a construction time of about 5.5 years. INVAP will be 
heading a consortium with Australian firms in the fields of architecture, engineering and 
instrumentation. The civil engineering works will consist of four buildings with about 12,000 
square meters of covered space, and the reactor will have a 20% enriched uranium nucleus.  
 
  Besides producing radioactive isotopes for medical research and treatment, as well as 
other industrial applications, a research and teaching center in the use of neutron technologies 
will be set up for use by Australian science and engineering students. The future installation 
will also be able to provide materials testing services using neutron activation techniques, as 
well as irradiation services for agriculture and industry.  
 
   As stated above, this is not the first such sale of atomic energy technology from 
Argentina. Similar, though smaller, nuclear reactors have been sold to Peru, Egypt and 
Algeria. The process of acquiring mastery of nuclear engineering technology started way 
back, in 1951, with the creation of the National Atomic Energy Commission, and the vehicle 
adopted was via the construction of atomic energy power plants. Although these plants were 
contracted on a turn-key basis, a deliberate process of learning was undertaken both at the 
design and construction sites, through interaction with the German firm supplying the 
technology, as well as by sending technical personnel abroad to study and acquire experience 
in the nuclear field. 
  
                                                 
    
9 Information from La Nacion, 2000, Martinez Vidal, undated, INVAP web-page, and Capdevila, 2002.  
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  The two first atomic plants for electric generation built in Argentina, Atucha I and 
Atucha II, went into operation in 1973 and 1983 respectively. From the very beginning, 
CNEA realized how important the technological learning process associated with such 
projects could be for the development of local suppliers and the acquisition of domestic 
technical capabilities. Thus the contract with Siemens A.G. for the construction of Atucha I, 
included clauses committing it to buy local parts and services for up to DM 100 million. The 
acquisitions were earmarked for items in civil engineering, assembly, transportation, 
insurance, and electro-mechanical parts and components.  
 
  Given the likelihood that due to lack of prior experience, diseconomies of scale, etc., 
local supplies would be more expensive, CNEA agreed to assume the cost differences. 
Additionally, to make local supplies more competitive with those provided from abroad, a 
special law was enacted to: exempt such supplies from sales taxes, provide a tax rebate, and 
also exempt them of prior deposit and surcharge requirements in the case of local supplies 
requiring imported parts. A review conducted some 2 1/2 years after the above promotional 
measures were enacted, showed that the original list of 71 competitive items had been 
expanded to include 25 additional ones, and purchases and work orders for DM 16 million 
had been locally placed. Among the parts and equipment provided were: heat exchangers, 
ventilation systems, water treatment equipment, electrical transformers from 1,000 to 1,600 
KVA, steel tubing for vapor and high pressure water, condensers tubing, electrical cables, 
valves and pumps, condenser covers, refrigeration tubing, etc. Up to the time of the review, 
the CNEA had "bought" the local supplies with an implicit average protection of about 24%, 
when considering the local factory prices with the tax rebates vis a vis foreign FOB prices, 
and an average of about 4% when considering the supplies placed at the Atucha site. 
 
  The extent of local participation has varied significantly with the type of work and 
skills required. While in civil construction the extent of local participation was up to 90%, for 
electromechanical components it was about 12%. It has been estimated that local participation 
reached about 40% of the total cost. More important, perhaps, for local industry than the 
physical extent, or monetary value, of its participation, was the realization that it could meet 
strict quality norms, as well as the scheduling requirements, of such a major project in a new 
technological field. Following the successful experience with Atucha I, the CNEA devised a  
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promotional program for local participation in the provision of additional selected equipment 
and parts, as well as the acquisition of advanced metallurgical technologies utilized  in the 
construction of nuclear reactors.  
   
  CNEA has had an intensive program for upgrading its human capital; hundreds of 
scientists, engineers and technicians have been sent for training abroad. It has also developed 
a large cadre of local subcontractors. As mentioned above, the acquired engineering design 
and construction capabilities in the nuclear power field are now being marketed by a separate 
firm, INVAP, which employs more than 300 professionals and conducts R&D for CNEA as 
well as for private industry. Besides its strength in nuclear engineering, INVAP has a 
significant aerospace program, having built several satellites meeting NASA specifications, 
and is also active in a number of other industrial applications such as the development of food 
conservation processes, and the design and construction of industrial waste disposal facilities.  
 
  Although further expansion of the nuclear power sector in Argentina might be limited, 
inter alia, by the discovery of substantial natural gas fields, the development of high quality 
R&D and engineering capabilities for nuclear peaceful applications is now finding its rewards 
in successful exports following bidding for large international projects. 
  
   B. Brazil. Aeronautical Industry 
  Areas of relative technological success in Brazil, include, EMBRAPA in agro-
technology; CTA in the development of civilian transport jet aircraft (successfully applied by 
EMBRAER), plus rocket fuel, and gaso-hol based engines; the arms industry (with its exports 
to Middle East and neighboring countries); segments of the steel industry, well established in 
major export markets, and the automotive industry, after relocations within MERCOSUR, 
with successful technological adaptations that find application in neighboring and other 
developing countries
10. Mention should also be made of the Brazilian generics pharmaceutical 
industry, which, similarly to those of India and South Africa,  can produce, at low cost and 
with the required quality standards, the equivalent of many of the patented drugs now used in 
AIDS treatment programs across the world. In terms of sheer technological and 
                                                 
    
10 On the other hand, Mexico, also a large recipient of FDI by major MNCs, has its automotive industry set up 
mostly to supply the North American market within the NAFTA framework.   
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entrepreneurial achievement though, EMBRAER clearly takes the place of honor among all 
above mentioned accomplishments. 
 
  Case Study: EMBRAER
11 
  Founded as a public enterprise in 1969, EMBRAER's first popular commuter plane, 
the 19 seat EMB-110, known as the "Bandeirante", was originally introduced in the US in 
1978. At that time, from a total production run of 500 planes, about half were exported, with 
126 registered in the US by 1983. Since the introduction of the Bandeirante, EMBRAER has 
produced more than 5,000 aircraft, and a substantial proportion of them have been exported to 
foreign markets.  
 
  The US is the largest market for commuter aircraft with about a 60% share of the total 
aircraft demand world-wide. USA's plus Canada's demand accounts for about 3/4 of total 
world demand. Given the dominant size of the US market, its regulations critically affect the 
production of commuter aircraft. A specially important FAA regulation was the requirement 
that, for safety reasons, an aircraft seating 20 or more passengers had to have at least one 
flight attendant. Not surprisingly, a strong demand ensued for aircraft seating 19 passengers. 
This was the market niche EMBRAER entered with the Bandeirante plane. 
 
  The economics of the industry was strongly affected by the Middle East oil crisis of 
the early 1970s. Relatively low fuel costs had made the relationship between passenger 
carrying capacity and labor costs (maintenance and operating crews), the critical factor in 
aircraft selection during the 1960s.  From the early 1970s to the early 1980s, fuel costs rose 
from around 13% to about 50% of direct operating expenses. Thus fuel efficiency in relation 
to carrying capacity and distance travelled acquired much greater importance. Relatively fuel- 
inefficient aircraft in use during the 1960s, such as the DC-8 and Boeing 707, were forced out 




                                                 
    




  The market for commuter aircraft was also substantially boosted in the US by 
deregulation of the airline industry in 1978. Prior to that, with prices fixed by the government, 
price discrimination by routes was quite common, with higher prices set on international, or 
long distance, routes, used to finance lower prices in shorter routes. Deregulation made it less 
profitable to operate short-haul routes with regular aircraft carrying a reduced number of 
passengers per plane, and with the increased competition that ensued the airlines could not 
continue subsidizing their shorter distance routes with higher fares for the international, or 
longer distance, routes. Smaller commuter airlines stepped in to fill the void left by the larger 
carriers in catering to destinations with a low number of passengers, and small, but efficient, 
aircraft were required for that purpose. With the major US aircraft producers (Boeing, 
MacDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed) not participating, the field was left to smaller 
international firms such as Fokker/Fairchild, Saab, De Havilland, British Aerospace, Dornier 
(Germany) and CASA (Spain). This group was joined by EMBRAER which at the time of 
deregulation in the US was a less than a decade old firm with just one certified commuter 
plane, the 19 seats turbo-prop Bandeirante.  
 
   The Brazilian government supported the development of EMBRAER to ensure that it 
would not fail as did previous attempts to create an aeronautical industry in the country. 
Government support was centered around four key areas: protection of the domestic market, 
help in export promotion, finance, and research and development. Besides an initially high 
tariff of 50 % (instituted in 1977 and lowered to 20% in 1986) that deterred imports of 
commuter type aircraft for Brazilian airlines
12, the government also enacted a law of 
"similars" which prohibited, with some exceptions, the acquisition of foreign planes by the 
public sector when a domestic substitute was available. These protective policies were 
effective in shutting out imports of commuter planes into Brazil. Whereas US suppliers sold 
about 600 planes to Brazil in 1974, and 628 in 1975, they were only able to sell 43 planes 
during the decade 1976-1985. 
 
  The policy of helping to project the firm abroad was not only successful in penetrating 
key international markets, but was also instrumental in gaining access to important 
                                                 
    
12 The level of real protection against imports was considerably higher than the nominal tariffs since other 
duties and tariffs, not specific to the aircraft industry, simultaneously applied.  
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technologies and partnerships which in turn brought new customers and markets. As regards 
finance, besides supporting specific projects via FINEP programs, the government offered 
special tax incentives for private investors in EMBRAER who were required, in return, to 
leave part of their earnings in the firm for R&D purposes. Finally, but perhaps most 
importantly, EMBRAER had access to state-supported aeronautical engineering and 
aerospace R&D institutes (CTA and INPE) which were responsible, together with 
EMBRAER's technical personnel, for the designs of its new planes. EMBRAER was charged 
a small fee for the use of these facilities, but the arrangement was very convenient since the 
institutes were located close to EMBRAER's physical plant. The design for the Bandeirante 
originated in CTA, and was successfully transferred to EMBRAER following its creation in 
1969.  
 
  Besides design, the technologies required to stay abreast in the aircraft  industry 
include: avionics, advanced metallurgy and metalworking materials, and assembly 
techniques. To obtain the technological assets it required EMBRAER resorted to licensing, 
international partnerships, subcontracting agreements, and local R&D. Licensing: EMBRAER 
signed an agreement in 1975 with Piper Aircraft to produce various Piper plane models for 
the domestic market. During the period 1975-1985, an EMBRAER subsidiary produced 1,800 
Piper airplanes. Manufacturing techniques were also transferred, and, by the 1980s, about 
70% of the Piper aircraft parts were manufactured locally. Similar arrangements were also 
made for military aircraft. Through a license agreement with the Italian firm Aermacchi,  
EMBRAER produced the twin-seat light attack plane EMB-326 Xavante derived from the 
Italian model MB 326. Production of the Xavante was licensed in 1970, and in 1981, when 
the production line was closed, EMBRAER had produced 166 planes. Besides being used by 
the Brazilian armed forces, the Xavante was exported to Argentina, Paraguay and Togo. 
International Partnerships: The manufacture with two Italian firms, Aeritalia and Aermacchi, 
of the AMX light attack aircraft is worth mentioning among the partnerships with 
manufacturers in industrialized countries. Each company produced part of the plane with 
EMBRAER being in charge of some of the most complex parts, including the wings, 
electrical system and pylons and external tanks. The AMX is already in service in Italy and 
Brazil, and a number of military forces have expressed interest in its design. Subcontracting 
agreements: EMBRAER has done extensive manufacturing work in subassemblies for large  
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airliners (beyond the size of those it produces). Thus it has manufactured the outboard flaps 
for the McDonnell Douglas MD-11, (made of carbon fiber composite), and has also produced 
nose-wheel doors and other components for the Boeing 747. In 1976, in exchange for the 
purchase of Northrop F-5E fighters, the Brazilian government required production offsets 
including the production  of tail assemblies by EMBRAER. Metal-bonding technologies were 
transferred with that agreement. Domestic R&D: The above not withstanding, the most 
important technology source for EMBRAER has been domestic R&D. The state-supported 
aeronautical research institutes have been the source of many technological advances 
incorporated in EMBRAER's aircraft. Moreover, it can be argued that collaboration with 
foreign manufacturers was possible precisely because of EMBRAER's previous success with 
planes of its own design
13. Thus by entering into strategic partnerships, EMBRAER was able 
to gain important new customers and access to cutting-edge technologies, and by having a 
high quality indigenous design group it brought a valuable asset to the bargaining table.  
 
   Probably the main lesson to be derived from EMBRAER's experience has to do with 
the strategic advantage it enjoyed because of its own design and technological capabilities. 
An important difference with other developing countries firms manufacturing high-
technology goods, is that they generally rely on foreign MNCs for their technologies rather 
than manufacture according to their own designs, as did EMBRAER in a majority of cases. 
These capabilities were also key assets when negotiating joint ventures, licensing, and 
subcontracting agreements. Very important also, specially in the initial stages, was the 
protection granted in the domestic market which enabled the firm not only to plan ahead with 
a fair degree of certainty about the viability of its projects, but also permitted the attainment 
of economies of scale in production, plus the revenue to undertake significant R&D 
investments. It was also important to count with facilitated access not only to the domestic 
civilian, but also to the military, market, ensuring that it had a significant market outlet, 
should one of the two segments be doing poorly. Similarly, EMBRAER exhibited strong 
performance both domestically and abroad, which allowed it to continue with its development 
projects even when the Brazilian economy was doing poorly. 
                                                 
    
13 According to Mowery, 1987, the Piper licensing agreement only took place  after EMBRAER's success 
with the Bandeirante, and, similarly, the agreement with  Italian firms for the production of the AMX military 
trainer plane, was signed because EMBRAER had already shown the capacity to produce its own version of a 




  In sum, by fielding high quality products capable to compete with those of major 
subsidized firms from industrialized countries, EMBRAER was able to capture a large share 
of the US market, the world's largest for commuter aircraft. In 1994 EMBRAER's stock was 
auctioned to private investors
14, and today it is listed in the New York Stock Exchange. It has 
become the fourth largest producer of civilian aircraft in the world and was Brazil's largest 
exporter in 2001, and the second largest in 2002.  
     
        C. Korea. Digital Telephony Switching 
  Korea attained spectacular industrial development in a little over two decades in the 
process becoming a top producer in world markets of textiles, plywood, steel products, 
shipbuilding, etc. Korea developed large conglomerates ("chaebols"), such as Daewoo, 
Goldstar, and Samsung, in major manufacturing fields, as well as firms such as Posco which 
runs Pohang, the largest steel mill in the world. An initial reluctance to allow FDI in many 
sectors has been followed, more recently, by a willingness to engage in cooperative efforts 
with major MNCs to obtain new technologies in emerging fields. The development of digital 
switching equipment based on its own R&D, and carried out by a government sponsored 
consortium, clearly constitutes the most important technological achievement attained by 




                                                 
    
14 The privatization path followed by EMBRAER in 1994, goes against an international trend towards greater 
involvement of the public sector in the industry. The Airbus consortium, for example, now competing strongly 
with Boeing and other US firms, receives subsidies, protection, and capital investments from the governments of 
European participating firms. Moreover, most consortium participating firms are nationalized. Saab, besides 
being the sole manufacturer of military aircraft for the Swedish Air Force, also receives public financial support 
for R&D. Finally, Canadair and De Havilland Canada (DHC), were both nationalized to maintain a military 
aircraft industry in Canada,.   
 
  23
Case Study: The TDX Switching Project
15    
 
  This major R&D effort was carried out jointly by the Korean government and private 
industry, and was instrumental in the country's completion of its automated nation-wide 
telephone network by 1987. 
 
  By adopting digital technologies Korea bypassed the existing, and still prevalent, 
analogue technologies and did so successfully and in record time. While the government also 
promoted R&D efforts in mini-computers and dynamic random access memory (DRAM) 
chips, its biggest success, and the one program that has had a major domestic and 
international payoff, has been the development of the digital electronic telephone switching 
system, applied to its own automated telephone system since the mid 1980s. When originally 
conceived, this project was the largest R&D project ever attempted in the country. Besides the 
management of large human and financial resources, it demanded close coordination among 
public R&D laboratories, private sector manufacturers, as well as Korea Telecom, destined to 
be the first, and main, customer of the system. 
 
  Korea had the advantage of not having invested heavily in the infrastructure required 
for electro-mechanical switching systems, since integrating them with the new electronic 
(digital) switching exchanges is more expensive, and technically difficult, than building a new 
electronic switching system from scratch. It was also a fortunate coincidence that the cost of 
installing digital switching had been falling during the 1980s, and by the time Korea launched 
its program, it was already significantly lower than the cost of installing analogue switching
16.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that digital switching technologies were more difficult, 
or complex, to develop and implement, because substantial expertise in electronics, semi-
conductors, and software were required. Paradoxically, this same feature also made it 
attractive to Korean planners since once a qualified R&D team was assembled, it could be  
                                                 
    
15 Based on Norman, 1997, UNDP, WIDE. 
    
16 See Antonelli, 1991, for a discussion of the diffusion of advanced telecommunications technologies in 
developing countries.  
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available to develop other cutting-edge technologies in semi-conductors, computers and 
telecommunications. 
 
  In 1973, the Korean Institute for Science and Technology (KIST), with GTE's 
assistance, developed new switching technology on a small scale, and, in 1981, presidential 
advisors recommended improving industrial, rather than consumer, electronics, and to focus 
on switching technologies. The TDX-1 pilot project was then launched. The project was 
started in the Telecommunications Research Institute (KTRI), established in 1977 under the 
aegis of the Ministry of Science and Technology, and later transferred to the new Electronics 
and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) subordinate to the Ministry of 
Communications. This reorganization reflected, at least in part, that the primary customer of 
TDX equipment was destined to be Korea Telecom also dependent of the same ministry. 
 
  Once it become known that Korea Telecom was going to invest in an electronic 
switching system, "chaebols" Goldstar and Samsung decided to participate and so did a 
smaller firm, Otelco. All had been assembling digital switching equipment, albeit on a small 
scale. Korea Telecom joined in the development of the TDX system and international partners 
were also involved. Goldstar had an agreement with ATT, Samsung with BTM of Belgium, 
and Otelco with Ericsson. 
 
  The project required a great deal of coordination to maintain product and engineering 
quality control, since, prior to the joint R&D project, each manufacturer had been producing 
its own individual models of digital switching devices. Planning of future development of the 
telephone network was also involved since analogue switches had to be replaced in urban 
areas where they were already in place, while at the same time expanding the new telephone 
network to rural areas. The project nevertheless grew rapidly with R&D personnel at ETRI 
expanding from 20 staff in 1981 to 100 in 1982 and 250 in 1983. All of them, except for some 
high level managerial personnel, were locally trained. Some key technology was licensed 
from Ericsson and some ETRI staff travelled to Sweden for technical training. By 1984 the 
project had produced the first prototype of the TDX-1 system, and its TDX-1A version, with 
10,000 lines, was operational by 1986. A modified version, with digital switches for lower 
density use in rural areas, called TDX-1B, was then developed. 23,000 lines were installed in  
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1986 using the new switches, and by the late 1980s the system was already being exported to 
other countries. The TDX-10, a large scale, high-density system, for use in urban areas, was 
developed and installed during the 1990s. 
 
  By the early 1990s, Korea was approaching self-sufficiency in the design and 
production of some digital switching equipment, and had been exporting parts of the TDX 
system since 1985. It was estimated that by 1993, locally designed switches had already been 
installed in 55% of the local market, and the number of lines supplied with TDX technology 
had increased from some 24,000 lines in 1985 to 1.3 million lines in 1990, and more than 10 
million lines by 1997. It has been estimated that the total cost of the project was 115 million 
dollars, and implementation spanned the period 1982-1995. From 1991 when the first export 
order was shipped, to 1997, more than 3.5 million TDX exchange lines have been exported to 
23 countries. 
   
  D. Taiwan. Computers, parts and components.   
  Taiwan also followed a strategy strongly based in exports to compensate for its limited 
market. It was also reluctant to import technologies as part of a FDI package, but, as 
distinguished from Korea, did not stress large scale undertakings and enterprises preferring 
instead a development based on SMEs, at least in the initial phases of its industrial growth 
following the attainment of autonomy  from Mainland China. While initially emphasizing 
labor intensive exports such as textiles, it found itself pretty soon with the need to diversify 
into more skill and capital intensive industries. To accomplish this while retaining the 
emphasis in SMEs and the reluctance to allow major FDI, the government sponsored R&D 
consortia and a science and technology park. 
 
    Nevertheless, the case study we focus on reflects the practically autonomous 
development of a by now very large enterprise in the computer field which received little or 
no benefits from the government, and grew phenomenally while retaining its independence 
from both foreign investors and public intervention. 
 





  Originally called Multitech International Company, ACER was established in 1976 by 
11 US-trained engineers, with very little capital, to produce computer components. It has now 
grown to become one of the main international producers of computers, and their parts, 
including sophisticated components such as monitors and mother-boards, as well as advanced 
lap-top models. The trajectory followed by ACER has been quite spectacular, particularly for 
an enterprise in a developing country, since in less than 30 years it has grown from being a 
subcontractor of original equipment manufacturing (OEM) for foreign corporations, to 
become a large own-brand manufacturer (OBM), and more recently moving into "on demand" 
business in competition with IBM. 
 
  Some members of the initial group had Silicon Valley experience which helped them 
to sell their services to companies such as Intel and IBM. For ACER the period spent 
producing OEM for others was an important learning experience as it assimilated product and 
process technologies being transferred by its contractors. Thus ACER did not need initially to 
spend time and money establishing sales or distribution networks, or on consumer-oriented 
advertising to promote own-brand preference. Through its OEM relationships ACER learned 
all aspects of computer manufacturing, including those pertaining to input/output attachments, 
as well as other consumer electronic products, becoming, in a relatively short time, one of the 
world's largest manufacturers of personal computers (PCs), monitors, keyboards, fax 
machines, and printers. These outside orders also provided financing and helped to improve 
capacity utilization. 
 
  During the period 1981-1986, ACER devoted resources to in-house R&D for the 
development of a line of its own products, and to promote recognition of its own brand-name. 
Because of its lack of experience and own-brand recognition, ACER followed a "periphery to 
the core" marketing strategy that focused on entering smaller, emerging markets, before 
taking on the US and European markets. During this period, ACER also succeeded in its 
R&D efforts by developing, in 1982, Taiwan's first 8-bit home computer, and in 1986 it 
launched the world's second 32 bit PC, after Compaq, but well ahead of IBM. ACER 80386 
                                                 
    




computers were widely praised for their price and technology, and helped turn the company 
into a leading computer producer. Thus 1986 can be considered a turning point in the 
development of ACER's capabilities beyond OEM. Its computer sales grew from some 50 
million dollars in 1983 to about 550 million dollars in 1988, and about 60% of its sales were 
by then of products with its own brand. Its output of 400,000 PCs represented approximately 
six percent of the total world market. 
 
  By 1988, the ACER group employed some 4,000 people, of which 500, or 12.5%, 
were devoted to R&D. The group had expanded operations overseas and included subsidiaries 
in US, Europe, Japan and Hong-Kong. Off-shore manufacturing facilities were also 
established in China and Malaysia. Because it was now heavily engaged in OBM, a network 
of some 100 distributors was used to sell ACER PCs in some 70 different countries.     
 
  During the early 1990s ACER lost money in its OBM sales because of lack of brand 
awareness and limited market share. It then decided to place greater reliance on OEM and 
ODM. It also realized that heavy marketing and distribution expenditures during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, had diverted funds from R&D and production. Its renewed OEM 
strategy was instrumental in obtaining a large contract to supply APPLE with its popular 
notebook, the Power-book 145. Similarly, for the first time, IBM agreed to market ACER 
fully-assembled PCs to be sold under its brand name. This strategy of selling products of its 
own design and manufacture both under its own name and that of others, allowed ACER to 
maintain a level of operating capacity and profits that facilitated the financing of its R&D 
activities. By the end of 1996 more than 60& of the value of its sales was from own-brand 
name products, and success in its OBM activities remained its overriding objective. 
 
  Pari-passu with its commercial development, ACER retained and expanded its 
innovating capacity. In 1989 it formed a joint venture with Texas Instruments to develop 
DRAM chips, and in 1991 it invented a Chip Up technology for upgrading from 386 to 486 
technology. The derived line of PCs with upgradable technology become so popular that in 
1993 ACER licensed its Chip Up technology to Intel. Thus in a mere 17 years, ACER 
accomplished the feat of selling its own, newly developed technology, to Intel which had 
been one of its original subcontracting clients. In 1993, ACER introduced another chip- 
 
  28
related innovation by launching a PC with a reduced instruction-set chip (RISC), running on 
Microsoft's NT Windows operating system. The above chip innovations contributed to 
ACER's global image as a leader in chip technology recognized by major firms in the industry 
such as National Semiconductor, Texas Instrument, NEC, etc., that paid to license ACER's 
chip designs. 
 
  The ACER group is currently among the largest computer manufacturers and  vendors 
in the world. Although the firm, like other Taiwanese start up technology firms, profited, in 
general, from Taiwan's improved technological infrastructure and established export channels, 
it was not a firm located in the Hsin-Chi Science Park, benefitting from participation in 
government sponsored research consortia, or receiving technical assistance from public R&D 
institutes. Rather, it was a latecomer that thanks to its well-qualified engineering manpower 
and the learning obtained by doing subcontracting work, was able to enter the market at a 





 IV.  OVERVIEW 
 
  Table 7 below summarizes the experience of the four case studies, and then we briefly 
describe for each one, the main product or process innovation, the entrepreneurial origins of 
the enterprise, its technology and skill sources, main institutions and policies that affected its 
performance, and the ownership structure adopted,  
 











































































 A.  Innovations 
  All four cases involve products and/or processes normally categorized as requiring the 
mastery of technologies that are "complex", "advanced", "high", or "cutting-edge". All four 
cases also involve design, R&D, and engineering and construction skills. Thus from the 
viewpoint of technological development they are normally to be found in advanced, 
innovating, industrialized countries. All cases, to different degrees, have seen their 
technological prowess validated internationally by exports, licenses, etc. Thus they have met 
stringent competitive standards.  
 
  B. Entrepreneurial sources 
  Three of the four cases received significant doses of public entrepreneurship. 
Elements of the armed forces played an important initial role in promoting nuclear power in  
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Argentina as well as in the acquisition of an aeronautical capability in Brazil. Interestingly 
enough, Argentina also tried hard to develop its aircraft design and manufacturing 
capabilities, but did not attain Brazil's level of achievement with EMBRAER. 




  In Korea's case, the government's entrepreneurial intervention, which was decisive, 
entailed, first, the determination to "go digital" thereby largely leapfrogging electro-
mechanical technologies then in use in telephony switching, plus the decision to set up an 
R&D consortium involving facilities in public R&D institutes as well as private 
manufacturing, and the main eventual public customer of the equipment to be designed 
locally. There was no public entrepreneurial intervention in the case of ACER which was the 
creation of a group of young technical expatriates. Moreover, as will be seen later, ACER did 
not benefit from important public interventions such as the establishment of a science park, 
and the various R&D consortia sponsored by the government to help SMEs (Mathews, 2001). 
 
  C. Technology sources 
  CNEA was the initial source of technical knowledge for all local engineers and 
physicists in the atomic power field in Argentina, as well as the mother institution of INVAP. 
When construction of the first atomic power plants took place, local personnel learned from 
the unpacking of the foreign technology, as well as from the procurement they participated in, 
and which was expressly promoted for learning purposes by the CNEA with the support of 
the national government. 
 
  CTA, a public research and design facility, provided the design for the first successful 
plane built by EMBRAER, the Bandeirante. Design for other planes was also done in house 
and EMBRAER also benefitted from advanced materials and other technologies acquired by 
doing subcontracting work and from licensing and joint venture agreements with foreign 
aircraft builders. These arrangements were in part made possible because of its engineering 
capabilities and the successes attained with its own designs. 
                                                 
    
18 Because of its dependence on imported oil, and in spite of the relative success of the gas-hol program, 




  While some initial, minor scale, switch manufacturing was carried out domestically 
with help from abroad, the TDX project was carried out by a local, government-sponsored 
consortium formed by ETRI, the public R&D institute assigned for this purpose, the principal 
manufacturers, as well as Korea Telecom, the main potential purchaser of the equipment to be 
designed and eventually manufactured. Some technical know-how was also obtained from 
abroad, and the manufacturers engaged in technical alliances and joint ventures with major 
international firms. 
 
  ACER did not benefit from science and technology institutions, such as the science 
park and R&D consortia, created by the Taiwanese government to help SMEs overcome size-
derived obstacles. It acquired its manufacturing technology from sub-contractual work (OME) 
for major international producers of computers and related equipment, moving then to the 
design of its own equipment which it managed to sell both under its own name and those of 
well established foreign firms. Finally, ACER ventured successfully into the redesign and 
design of chips, and even managed to license its own technology abroad to some of the same 
manufacturers that originally contracted with it to produce equipment for them.  
 
  D. Skills and their sources 
  Following their basic training at major Argentine public universities, physicists, 
chemists, and engineers employed by CNEA learned about nuclear power technology in 
house. Many were also sent abroad for post-graduate studies sponsored by CONICET. Their 
more applied skills were acquired by working in CNEA and INVAP as a result of the 
construction of the first nuclear power plants in Argentina, and the design and building of 
nuclear power research reactors, first for themselves, and later on for export contracts. 
 
  Basic training in aeronautical engineering was provided in major public Brazilian 
universities, and aircraft design skills were initially transferred from CTA which had adjacent 
facilities to EMBRAER's plant. Knowledge of advanced materials and manufacturing 
techniques was acquired by working in subcontracts for major international aircraft builders. 





  Electronic and electrical engineering degrees were granted in Korean universities, but 
applied skills involved in designing and manufacturing digital switches for telephony also 
required computer and software specialized skills that were learned by working with major 
international firms, and by sending staff to be trained abroad. 
 
  The core of ACER's skilled personnel in electrical and computer engineering was the 
original group of technically trained, and experienced abroad, expatriates that started the firm 
to do subcontracting work for major MNCs in the computer field. Chip design skills were 
acquired by "reverse" engineering and own R&D, with some technologies transferred to 
ACER by the firms for whom it was manufacturing OEM. 
 
 E.  Institutions 
  Undoubtedly, the key institution in developing the nuclear power field in Argentina 
has been CNEA. CONICET played an important role with its support of R&D projects and 
specialized training abroad.  
 
  For EMBRAER, the most important institutions have been the CTA from which it 
obtained the design for its first successful commuter plane, as well as FINEP for its financial 
support of R&D projects, and, indirectly, the BNDE. 
 
  The Korean government, through the Ministry of Telecommunications, played a 
critical role in the development of the TDX switching system by promoting the project and 
sponsoring the local R&D consortium that included the ETRI as well as Korea Telecom, plus 
the interested manufacturers. 
 
  ACER only benefitted from general science and technology and export infrastructure 
in the country, but made no use of the science park, or research consortia promoted by the 
government of Taiwan. 
 
 F.  Policies 
  The most important policy decision preceding the development of a nuclear  
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engineering capability in Argentina was undoubtedly the original interest of the armed forces, 
going back to the early 1950s, and which lead to the creation of an autonomous atomic energy 
agency, the CNEA. It further included the policy decisions to provide it with relative 
autonomy within the government, and with the necessary funding out of the federal budget. A 
subsidiary policy of importance, derived from the relative independence and technical 
prestige enjoyed by the CNEA, was its ability to push technological unpacking and domestic 
preferential procurement in the tenders for the construction of the first atomic power plants in 
Argentina. R&D appropriations for the CNEA have been reduced recently, in part, because 
energy policy in the country is becoming more reliant on natural gas. 
 
  For EMBRAER undoubtedly the initial protection of the Brazilian commuter plane 
market gave the firm the necessary assurance to plan, invest, and even do R&D to develop 
new aircraft. Of importance have also been the export promotion policies that permitted the 
firm to gain a foothold in major foreign markets. External policy developments, particularly 
in the US, significantly affected   EMBRAER's success. First was the regulation that 
EMBRAER benefitted of with its Bandeirante plane, to have to include at least one flight 
attendant when 20 or more passengers were flying, and which obviously stimulated the 
development of 19 seat planes. Second, and equally important for EMBRAER, was the 
deregulation of the US aviation industry in 1978, which provided a strong boost to the 
commuter aviation industry and to the production of smaller, regional, aircraft. 
 
  The policy decision "to go digital" was undoubtedly crucial for the development of the 
TDX system. Instrumental were also the government interventions in sponsoring the R&D 
consortium and in involving the consumers (Korea Telecom) and producers (major 
"chaebols" with international partners) of the future equipment. Export promotion policies 
have also been important to facilitate expansion of productive capacity beyond the needs for 
the domestic market. 
 
  ACER was not the direct beneficiary of any policies aimed at stimulating its activities. 
It did benefit, however, from general export promotion policies. Of determining importance 
were its own internal strategic decisions as to how to balance the original OEM work with its 
ODM and OBM capabilities. Similarly critical was its decision to carry out own R&D which  
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led to significant chip developments, and strengthened the company's position among its 
international clientele.  
 
  G. Ownership structure 
  INVAP is a joint venture between the federal government and the province of Rio 
Negro in the south-west of the country. The firm was segregated from CNEA and absorbed 
part of its R&D and technical personnel. It acts as an autonomous enterprise with total 
independence in its technical, operational and financial activities. 
 
  EMBRAER started as a joint venture, with a large public sector majority share, and a 
tiny private participation. It went private in 1994 with a public stock offering, and the firm is 
now listed in the NYSE. 
 
  The development of the TDX system only required temporary consortium type 
arrangements between the Ministry of Telecommunications and the various Korean public 
and private participating entities. Once the research and development work had been 
completed, these special arrangements were terminated. 
 
  ACER is a wholly private firm which has recently made a public stock offering.      
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  V. Concluding Remarks 
 
  It might be tempting to characterize the case studies we presented as just individual 
instances, or exceptions, that merely confirm the rule that significant technological 
developments only take place in advanced, highly industrialized countries, because they 
require the workings of well integrated national innovation systems. 
       
  In his overall review of the country cases included in Nelson, 1993
19, the editor noted 
the important role of government defense expenditures in promoting technological 
development and the acquisition of new technological capabilities in various countries. Also 
of importance seems to have been the role played by education; institutions and policies, such 
as the promotion of competition, and exports, were also required. He also noted that there 
seems to have been little or no evidence of well thought-out, and structured, industrial policy, 
but rather cases of infant industry protection plus some R&D subsidies. The promotion of 
"high-tech" industries constituted a special case in most countries, and "market failure" seems 
to have been the preferred justification for government intervention. In a number of countries, 
innovation systems, narrowly considered, tended to be sectorial and not "national" in scope. 
 
  While Taiwan established a number of publicly guided research consortia to 
compensate for diseconomies scale, Korea did so only to spearhead R&D deemed critical for 
the development of telecommunications technology, even though the firms involved were all 
of large size. Korea resisted direct foreign investment, encouraging instead the development 
of large national firms, while Taiwan, although also restricting the role of FDI, insisted on 
basing its industrial and technological development in SMEs. Thus, no clear picture emerges 
from the summary review undertaken by Nelson.  
  
  In our case studies, the results clearly point to the confluence of several key factors, 
but not necessarily to the workings of an integrated national innovation system. Skills, 
institutions, and policies played critical roles in all of them, with strong doses of public   
                                                 
    
19 The book edited by Nelson includes national studies for nine advanced and five developing countries that 
do not share a common theme or outline. The only attempt at classification is by grouping the advanced 
countries according to size.    
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entrepreneurship in all cases except Taiwan's. The emphasis on own, indigenous, 
technological development, as opposed to obtaining technical knowledge through foreign 
investment, is also an across the board finding. Clearly, resorting to the acquisition of 
autonomous technological capabilities would not have been an option without the availability 
of significant cadres of highly skilled technical manpower, at times complemented by training 
abroad as well as licensing or partnership agreements.   
 
  The cases we studied also indicate the importance of historical developments and 
individual decisions that played a critical role in assuring the success of particular 
undertakings. The support of the military was crucial for the development of nuclear energy 
in Argentina, and the aeronautical industry in Brazil. But EMBRAER also benefitted, to an 
important extent, from changes in policy regulations in the major market it wanted to tackle, 
the USA. The development of digital switching technology in Korea required major public 
entrepreneurship, while, on the other hand, ACER in Taiwan, is a strong example of private 
undertaking with little or no governmental support. 
 
  While all the above mentioned individual, or particular, decisions were of critical 
importance, and there is no clear evidence that an integrated innovation system was required, 
it can be argued that they only led to fruitful results because of the levels of industrialization, 
skill development, and technological accomplishment, previously attained in the countries 
studied.   
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